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WASHINGTON CASE LAW

recognizes the tortfeasor's death only insofar as his defenses are
terminated thereby. There is no indication in the principal case that
this issue was recognized or considered by the court.
It is unfortunate that the court in the principal case also did not
consider the deceased's lack of opportunity to rebut the blood analysis.
When a blood alcohol test reveals an alcohol content of 0.15 per cent or
more by weight, Washington Revised Code section 46.56.010 u raises a
rebuttable presumption, in criminal prosecutions, of being "under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." The court noted in City of Seattle v.
Bryanul that a defendant's own testimony may be sufficient to overcome this presumption of intoxication. In the principal case, death
precluded any possible explanation by decedent of the 0.14 per cent
analysis of his blood. Admission of blood analysis results in a tort
action alleging intoxication of a party no longer able to offer explanation of the results would seem to prejudice decedent's estate as
defendant.
PROPERTY
Power of Termination-Effect of Failure To Exercise Within A
Reasonable Time. The Washington court recently considered the
effect of prolonged silence and lack of affirmative action by the holder
of a power of termination after a condition subsequent has been broken.
In 1884, the grantor conveyed land to a water company. The deed
required that the land be used for a right of way to conduct water,
enforceable by a power of termination reserved to the grantor and his
heirs. The land was subsequently conveyed to plaintiff by a deed subject to the same condition. Prior to 1905, the condition occurred when
the land was set aside for park purposes. Not until 1963, when the
heirs of the original grantor filed a counter-claim to plaintiff's quiet
title action, was forfeiture claimed under the power of termination. The
trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. On
appeal, held: Failure to exercise a power of termination within a
reasonable time after occurrence of a condition subsequent results in
loss of the power of termination. MetropolitanPark Dist. v. Unknown
Heirs of John L. Rigney, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 764, 399 P. 2d 516 (1965).
When a fee simple subject to condition subsequent in real property
is created, the party entitled to enforce the condition is said to have a
right of re-entry or a power of termination. This power of termination
" Supra note 4.

1253 Wn2d 321, 333 P2d 392 (1958).
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becomes a present possessory interest only when its holder takes
some affirmative action. Until that time, the grantee's fee does not
terminate.'
In the principal case, the court rejected an argument that plaintiff
acquired a fee simple absolute by adverse possession. The court
reasoned that it was conceptually illogical to assert that the holder
of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent may obtain the whole
fee merely by staying in possession after breaking the condition. There
can be no adversity, as any act of the grantee is consistent with his
estate until the power of termination is exercised.' The court held,
however, that the holder of a power of termination, "following a continuing breach of condition, is not entitled to endlessly sit by refusing
to declare a forfeiture, and thus control the use of the property indefinitely."' The court reasoned that allowing the holder of a power of
termination to refrain from taking affirmative action indefinitely contravenes sound economic policy by discouraging productive use of land.
It also reasoned that "all policy considerations which justify the imposition of statutes of limitation would justify limiting the time within
which an election could be made after breach of condition.",
Although there is support for the proposition that the power of termination can be lost by inaction, the courts differ as to the rule that should
be applied.5 Some courts have held that delay, no matter how long,
does not preclude exercise of the power of termination unless substantial prejudice to the grantee or his successors in interest has resulted.' Other courts have held that delay past the statutory period of
1Halverson v. Pacific County, 22 Wn.2d 532, 156 P.2d 907 (1945) ; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 57 (1936).
2 See Mills v. Pennington, 213 Ark. 43, 209 S.W2d 281 (1948) ; New York v. Coney
Island Fire Dep't, 170 Misc. 787, 10 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1939), affd, 259 App. Div.
286, 18 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 527, 32 N.E.2d 827 (1941);
Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N.Y. 270, 28 N.E. 627 (1891); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 222, comment g (1936); SIMES & SMrTH, THE LAw oF, FUTURE INTERESTS § 258
(2d ed. 1936). For a survey of the Washington law on adverse possession see Stoebuck,
The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 53 (1960).
3 65 Wash. Dec2d at 767, 399 P2d at 518 (1965).
4Id.

at 768, 399 P2d at 518.

5 Cases are collected in Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1955).
6 Lowery v. Hawaii, 215 U.S. 554 (1910) (where Hawaii used land inconsistent
with the conditions imposed on its use, but failed to elect either to forfeit the land and
its improvement or pay $15,000, the Court found no substantial prejudice and allowed

the grantor to recover the land and improvements) ; Riverton Country Club v. Thomas,
141 N.J. Eq. 435, 58 A.2d 89, af'd, 1 N.J. 508, 64 A2d 347 (1948) (where grantee used
land twelve years contrary to conditions in the deed of conveyance and subsequently
made improvements on the land, the court found no prejudice to the grantee where there
was no proof that the grantor had actual knowledge of the misuse); New York v.
Coney Island Fire Dep't, 170 Misc. 787, 10. N.YS.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259
App. Div. 286, 18 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 527, 32 N.E.2d 827
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limitations will preclude exercise of the power. " Apparently, however,
the latter courts will require something more, such as substantial prejudice or the elements of estoppel, if the statutory period has not passed.8
Still other courts have applied a reasonable time testIn the principal case, the Washington court impliedly rejected the
view that, absent prejudice to the grantee, prolonged delay alone can
never cause loss of the power of termination. Although the court did
not discuss prejudice to the plaintiff in giving up a park which the
public had used for over fifty years, prejtidice to the grantee may still
be a factor in the reasonable time test. It is conceivable that prejudice
will become a more important operative factor as the time of delay
becomes shorter.
The court's citation of particular cases suggests other possible
factors of importance in determining reasonableness. In two of these
cases the statute of limitations was stated to be a determining factor 1 0
If the statute of limitations becomes a determining factor in Washington, it remains to be seen whether prejudice will-be a necessary element
when the delay is less than that period. in one case cited by the court,
delay for eight months was held to be'unreasonable, without discussion
of prejudice.1" In other cases, however, an element of estoppel was
required 2 Furthermore, it is submitted that a grantor should never
lose his power of termination on the ground of unreasonable delay if he
(1941) (where the condition in the deed had been in continuous disregard for over
forty years, the last fifteen of which the property remained vacant, the court -found no
prejudice); Ludlow v. Railroad Co., 12 Barb. 440 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1852) (where construction was not begun within the time set in the deed, but the grantee did subsequently
build as planned without objection by the grantor, the court found that it would be prejudicial to enforce the power of termination) ; Annot, 39 A.L.R2d 1116 (1955).
7 See, e.g., Jefferies v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d
810 (1950); Hannah v. Culpepper, 213 Ala. 319, 104 So. 751 (1925); Annot., 39
A.L.R.2d 1116 (1955).
8
See cases cited note 7 .vpra.
9
See, e.g., Goodman v. Southern Pac. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 424, 299 P.2d 321
(1956); Hale v. Elkhore Coal Co., 206 Ky. 629, 268 S.W. 304 (1925); 39 A.L.R.2d
1116 (1955).
10 Jefferies v. State ex.rel. Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W2d 810 (1950);
Hannah v. Culpepper, 213 Ala. 319, 104 So. 751 (1925) ; See Annot., 39 A.L.R2d 1116
(1955). In Washington, the normal statutory period within which a suit to regain possession of land must be brought is ten years. WASH. REV. ConE § 4.16.020 (1951). In
the principal case, because the plaintiff had paid taxes on the land and had been in possession under color of title, the seven year statutory period might have applied. WASH.
Rrv.
CoDE § 7.28.070 (1951).
11
Goodman v. Southern Pac. Co., 143 Cal. App2d 424, 299 P.2d 321 (1956). In
this case other conditions had also been broken. In regard to these conditions, there
had been delays of thirty-two, twenty-three, seventeen, sixteen, and five years. The
California court recognized that the eight month delay was short, but stated that it had
to be considered along with acquiescence to the other broken conditions.
12 See, e.g., Jefferies v. State ex. rel. Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d
810 (1950); Hannah v. Culpepper, 213 Ala. 319, 104 So. 751 (1925); Annot., 39
A.L.R2d 1116 (1955).
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did not have notice or could not be charged with notice of the fact that
the condition subsequent had been broken.'"
The rule in this case should not be extended to apply to a brief use of
the property inconsistent with the conditions in the deed, followed by
resumption of a proper use. In such a situation the grantee should not
be able to successfully contend that the power to terminate for any
future use inconsistent with the particular condition has been lost 1 '
However, the grantee might successfully argue that the grantor should
not be allowed to exercise his power to terminate with respect to the
prior occurrence of the condition.
TORTS
Abolition of Doctrine of Charitable Immunities. The doctrine
of charitable immunity in Washington appears to have been finally
abolished by two recent decisions of the Washington Supreme Court.
In Friend v. Cove Methodist Chuch, Inc., 65 Wash. Dec.2d 155, 396
P.2d 546 (1964), plaintiffs attended a smorgasbord dinner at defendant's church as "invited members of the public."' Directed to a
certain door as leading to the kitchen, plaintiff wife opened the door
and was severely injured when she fell into an open furnace pit. In the
second decision, Herbert v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop, 65
Wash. Dec.2d 165, 396 P.2d 552 (1964), plaintiff attended a Rosary
service and was injured when she tripped over a low wire fence. Each
plaintiff brought action for personal injuries, alleging negligent maintenance of defendant's premises. The cause of action was dismissed by
the trial court in Friend, and summary judgment for defendant was
granted in Herbert. In successive en banc decisions on appeal, held: A
religious charity may be sued by a non-paying patron for injuries
sustained as a result of the charity's negligence, and the defense of
charitable immunity from tort liability is abolished.

isWith respect to adverse possession, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run against an adverse possessor until a possession meets all the elements of adversity
under the statute. In Washington adverse possession must be open and notorious.
Slater v. Murphy, 55 Wn.2d 892,339 P2d 457 (1959). The word "notorious" means that
for possession to be adverse, it must be such as to give actual or constructive notice of
its existence to the land owner. Certainly it is enough if the owner has actual knowledge of the fact. This is not necessary, however, if the acts of possession are such as to
charge a reasonable man in the owner's position with notice of adverse possession.
Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L. Rxv. 53, 72
(1960).
1"See, e.g., Richie v. Kansas, N. & D. R.R., 55 Kan. 36, 39 Pac. 718 (1895) ; Annot.,
39 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1955).
'65 Wash. Dec2d at 155, 396 P2d at 547.

